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Almost three decades have elapsed since the publication of Dan Sperber and Deirdre 
Wilson’s (1986) seminal and most influential book Relevance. Communication and 
Cognition, and exactly two since the publication of its second edition (Sperber and 
Wilson 1995). In them, the authors presented and revised a series of claims and 
principles about human verbal communication and the foundational postulates of 
what is now known as ‘relevance theory’. Over all these years, their two books and 
numerous subsequent publications have given rise to a strand of research in 
pragmatics with a psychological basis and cognitive orientation. Often alluded to as 
‘relevance-theoretic pragmatics’, this strand seeks to unravel how the mind 
processes utterances –and, more widely, discourse– the contribution of diverse 
linguistic elements (e.g., discourse markers, particles, adverbials, intonation, etc.) to 
comprehension, why the mind arrives at a particular interpretation and the effects 
that may follow from understanding utterances in one way or another.  
Relevance theory has certainly awoken the interest of many pragmatists and 
linguists in general by posing many intriguing problems and thought-provoking 
questions. Relevance theorists’ continuous challenging of often-taken-for-granted 
assumptions, claims, generalisations, and even whole models, has also brought 
fresher air to those disciplines. Indeed, they have analysed in depth a wide variety of 
linguistic and communicative phenomena from a different perspective and with a 
new theoretical apparatus, which has shed much light onto underexplored or 
overlooked issues. 
This book celebrates these happiest anniversaries and, most importantly, the fact 
that relevance theory still continues to appeal to researchers, who find in it a very 
valuable model for understanding the intricacies of linguistic communication. This 
is a collection of papers, which very sincerely acknowledges the extensive work 
carried out not only by the authors of the theory themselves, but also by a large 
number of researchers who have elaborated on some of its postulates and 
distinctions, empirically tested some of its predictions or applied the theory to 
diverse domains or neighbouring fields, thus expanding its scope. Consequently, a 
tribute of deepest gratitude is paid to all of them for their brave efforts to answer 
questions related to an incredibly complex human activity. 
Ten papers are collected here. Five of them elaborate on issues that have 
traditionally concerned practitioners in relevance theory: the intentional nature of 
communication, how speakers guide hearers to recover intended meaning, how 
specific types of utterances or linguistic elements are interpreted, or the 
consequences of communication. Two papers apply the relevance-theoretic 
apparatus to account for features of some linguistic varieties or languages, thus 
helping to understand how they are structured and function. The remaining three 
papers present recent developments and further applications of the theory, as they 
consider epistemic vigilance mechanisms (Mascaro and Sperber 2009; Sperber et al. 
2010). More precisely, those papers address the interaction of some linguistic 
elements with such mechanisms, explain their role in rhetoric and argumentation, or 
consider their importance in second language teaching and acquisition. Finally, the 
book concludes with a chapter that suggests possible future directions for research 
in relevance-theoretic pragmatics.  
These works offer new insights and seek to fuel what can be considered an 
authentic revolution in pragmatics, particularly in its cognitive branch, which had 
scarcely been convulsed since the various publications on meaning and 
communication by philosopher of language Herbert Paul Grice. Although most of 
the chapters summarise essential postulates and explain the key notions they rely on, 
in what follows Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) views on communication, 
underlying assumptions, fundamental claims and basic concepts are presented. Since 
many readers will surely be familiarised with them, the following section is simply 
intended as a reminder. For those novel to the theory, this discussion supplies the 
necessary background that enables them to conveniently understand the works 
gathered here, as well as what relevance theory has meant. Next comes a review of 
research done in various areas from a relevance-theoretic perspective, which helps 
situate the chapters of this book in the wider panorama of relevance-theoretic 
pragmatics. Finally, this introductory chapter is closed with a description of the 
chapters. 
 
 1. The relevance-theoretic revolution 
 
In a field like linguistics, where most theories, models and frameworks have been 
constantly revised, refined, questioned and eventually abandoned in favour of others, 
referring to the contribution made by a particular one as a ‘revolution’ might sound 
presumptuous and even biased. Undeniably, proponents of new theories, models and 
frameworks have always been encouraged by a perennial and daring interest in 
unraveling how linguistic systems are organised and how they work at the service of 
communication, as well as in overcoming limitations in prior approaches. In a 
relatively young discipline like pragmatics, scholars have incessantly attempted to 
grasp the enormous complexity of human verbal communication, where linguistic 
systems are put to use to convey information and achieve goals that may crucially 
impact on human relationships, and the outputs of such systems have to be processed 
by an until fairly recently practically unknown mechanism like the human mind. 
Relevance theory originated as an exciting endeavour to find convincing answers 
to a series of only apparently simple and obvious questions for which many 
pragmatists could have thought there were final answers:  
- How do humans understand each other?  
- How do we arrive at a particular interpretation of what others say?  
- What makes us end up with a specific interpretation of an utterance?  
- Why do we select or reject an interpretation?  
In their search for answers to these questions, Sperber and Wilson challenged many 
tacitly accepted assumptions about how languages are used, how the human mind 
works and what might happen in it while processing input. Thus, they seriously 
questioned the code model of communication, which was deeply entrenched in the 
western linguistic tradition, and showed its many drawbacks, gaps and 
inconsistencies.  
Some progress had been made when the role of inference in communication was 
taken into consideration. Indeed, the also influential work by Grice (1957, 1975) –
wherein relevance theory is rooted and to which it is greatly indebted– meant a huge 
leap. However, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) went well beyond the so-called 
Gricean pragmatics by proposing a model that draws from valuable insights from 
disciplines such as philosophy of mind, developmental psychology or cognitive 
anthropology, to name but some. Thus, relevance theory incorporated some of their 
notions and views to pragmatics in order to offer a profoundly cognitive, 
psychological perspective that has implications for the nature and role of semantics 
and pragmatics. 
 
 1.1. Intention, manifestness and cognitive environments 
 
Like Grice (1975), Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) conceive of communication as 
an intentional activity, in which the speaker is prompted by two intentions: (i) her 
informative intention, which is her desire to make manifest to the audience a 
particular set of assumptions, and (ii) her communicative intention, which is her 
desire that the audience recognise that she actually has a particular informative 
intention. Recognising these two intentions requires theory of mind abilities –i.e., 
being able to attribute mental states to other individuals– and, therefore, 
metarepresenting the intentions and beliefs of others –i.e., creating representations 
of other public or private representations (Apperly 2012). These abilities make it 
possible for individuals to understand whether the communicator believes what she 
says is true –first-order mental states– or what the communicator knows the 
audience know, what the communicator intends the audience to believe, or what the 
communicator believes the audience believe –second-order mental states (Leekam 
1991; Happé 1994; Sullivan et al. 1995; Sullivan et al. 2003; Wilson 2013). These 
layers of metarepresentation can be depicted as follows (Sperber 1994: 195): 
 
Speaker intends (attribution of communicative intention - 4) 
me to know (communicative intention - 3) 
that she intends (attribution of informative intention - 2) 
me to believe (informative intention - 1) 
that p 
 
The notion of manifestness is a remarkable innovation. A certain fact or 
assumption is manifest to an individual at a certain time if that individual is capable 
of creating a mental representation of it and accepting that representation as true or 
probably true (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 39). The set of facts or assumptions of 
which an individual actually has a mental representation at a certain moment, or of 
which he may potentially form a mental representation, make up his cognitive 
environment. If two (or more) individuals are capable of forming similar, though not 
completely identical, representations of the same physical or psychological objects, 
those individuals share a mutual cognitive environment.  
Through the notion of manifestness Sperber and Wilson (1995: 18) overcome the 
drawbacks of notions like common knowledge (Lewis 1969) or mutual knowledge 
(Schiffer 1972), which implied that, for communication to succeed, individuals 
should mutually share a certain amount of knowledge. It is virtually impossible to 
distinguish the amount (and type) of knowledge that two (or more) individuals 
merely share from the knowledge that is truly mutual. Perceptual systems and 
cognitive mechanisms act like filters and greatly determine what individuals 
perceive and how they represent it. What is more, checking that two (or more) 
individuals actually share some knowledge would require time-consuming and 
almost never-ending mental operations.  
However, the innovativeness of relevance theory does not end here. Though 
sharing the Gricean view of communication as an intentional activity, Sperber and 
Wilson also react against some of Grice’s (1957, 1975) own ideas by arguing that, 
instead of the Cooperative Principle, two other general principles govern human 
cognition and communication. 
 
 
1.2. A theory based on two general principles 
 
Although based on Gricean pragmatics, relevance theory builds on it by rejecting 
some of its foundational postulates. Grice (1957, 1975) claimed that the Cooperative 
Principle and a series of maxims –those of quantity, quality, relevance and manner–
govern communication. Communicators may abide by, covertly violate or blatantly 
flout those maxims in order to convey implicit contents and achieve certain effects. 
Also, Grice (1975) acknowledged the existence of other maxims of a social or 
aesthetic nature, such as that of politeness, which led to some adherents to his ideas 
to elaborate on those maxims and suggest different models to account for 
(im)politeness (e.g., Lakoff 1973; Leech 1983). Others, in turn, modified the number 
or raised the status of the original maxims to that of principles (e.g., Horn 1996; 
Levinson 2000), thus giving rise to neo-Gricean approaches. However, the 
Cooperative Principle and its maxims seemed to be based on intuitions about 
communication and observations of a series of regularities.  
Relevance theory, in contrast, is a post-Gricean model; it questions the existence 
of the Cooperative Principle and its maxims, since their origin is unclear, they do 
not seem to have universal validity and their operation seems to have different effects 
depending on circumstances (Wilson and Sperber 1991a: 381, 1991b: 586). If 
anything, the Gricean Principle and maxims would have the status of (cultural) 
norms, understood as “[…] internalised, unconscious patterns that the individual 
follows without even noticing that he is complying with an unwritten model” 
(Escandell Vidal 2004: 349).  
Relying on a constant tendency that has propelled the evolution of the human 
species in general and the human mind in particular and greatly contributed to its 
efficiency –maximisation of gain in exchange of effort invested– Sperber and Wilson 
reject the Cooperative Principle and its maxims and propose two very general 
principles that govern communication and cognition1. Indeed, by ‘principle’ they 
understand a formalization of how a particular system works; in other words, a “[…] 
causal, mechanical explanation” (Escandell Vidal 2004: 349). These two principles 
are the cognitive and communicative principles of relevance. The former states that 
human cognition is geared towards the maximization of relevance and is argued to 
reflect how the human mind functions. The latter, in turn, claims that every act of 
intentional communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal 
relevance. This second principle operates in all cases of intentional communication 
and is responsible for the selection of an interpretation out of the many possible ones 
that an utterance may have: 
 
Communicators and audience need no more know the principle of relevance to 
communicate that they need to know the principles of genetics to reproduce. 
Communicators do not ‘follow’ the principle of relevance; and they could not violate 
it even if they wanted to. The principle of relevance applies without exception […] It 
is not the general principle, but the fact that a particular presumption of relevance has 
been communicated by and about a particular act of communication, that the audience 
uses in inferential comprehension. (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 162) 
 
These two new principles are based on the notion of ‘relevance’, which is the 
true cornerstone of the theory. Sperber and Wilson also characterise this notion in 
more precise terms than Grice (1957, 1975) actually did. 
 
 
1.3. An underlying key notion 
 
Grice (1975) included the maxim of relation and worded it as “be relevant”, but 
unfortunately he did not define what he took ‘relevance’ to be, nor did he clearly 
explain its role in communication. In contrast, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) 
portray relevance as a property of the stimuli individuals produce and, therefore, of 
a very special sub-set thereof: utterances. They define it on the basis of two factors:  
(i) The positive cognitive effects that information yields, or the improvements to 
our mental representation of the world or set of beliefs about it. Those 
improvements may be strengthening of previous beliefs, contradiction and 
eventual rejection of those beliefs or the formation of new beliefs from the 
interaction of previous ones with new information. 
                                                          
1
 In their 1986 work Sperber and Wilson only proposed a single principle. 
(ii) The processing or cognitive effort required by an item of information. This 
depends on the complexity of the linguistic form of the utterance that conveys 
that item of information (i.e., its syntactic structure, lexical items, etc.) or the 
effort of memory needed to retrieve or select a suitable context for processing 
it.  
These two factors are also essential for understanding what the presumption of 
optimal relevance involves: (a) utterances will normally be relevant enough –i.e., 
they will result in enough cognitive effects– for the hearer to decide to invest the 
cognitive effort necessary to process them, and (ii) the formulation of utterances will 
normally be the one the speaker thinks, given her abilities and preferences, will result 
in a satisfactory amount of cognitive effects (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 270). The 
first part of this presumption means that hearers normally expect some cognitive 
reward which they cannot obtain otherwise, i.e., positive cognitive effects or “[…] a 
worthwhile difference to [their] representation of the world […]” (Wilson and 
Sperber 2002: 251). In turn, the second part means that the speaker will normally be 
interested in producing utterances that are easily comprehensible and provide the 
hearer with enough evidences for the intended cognitive effects or additional 
cognitive effects rendering utterances optimally relevant (Wilson and Sperber 2002: 
256-257). Nevertheless, the speaker’s performance will depend on her own cognitive 
skills and capabilities, which may be conditioned by absentmindedness, tiredness, 
boredom, etc., and her goals, among which is complying with norms dictating, for 
instance, register, amount or type of information to dispense, formality, etc. 
(Mazzarella 2013: 33-35). 
In addition to the two principles of relevance, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 166) 
initially proposed a criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance, 
according to which an interpretation is consistent with the principle of relevance if, 
and only if, the speaker expects it to be optimally relevant. This means that, if the 
hearer finds an interpretative hypothesis optimally relevant, he should not think that 
the speaker intended a particular utterance to be optimally relevant under another 
interpretation. The hearer will think that an interpretative hypothesis was intended 
upon checking that it yields enough cognitive effects that offset a reasonable amount 
of cognitive effort. 
By clearly defining relevance and arguing that the constant search for optimal 
relevance governs human cognition and communication, Sperber and Wilson go well 
beyond Gricean pragmatics. However, as pointed out, relevance theory also reacts 
against the well-established code model of communication. Indeed, Sperber and 
Wilson conceive of communication as a human activity requiring a great amount 
inference, which has significant implications for understanding the role of semantics 
and pragmatics. 
  
1.4. A new conception of communication 
 
The code model metaphorically depicted communication as a process in which the 
code enables the speaker to package her thoughts (i.e., encoding) in a parcel (i.e., 
utterance) and send it over to the hearer (i.e., articulating and speaking). The hearer’s 
task is to open that parcel and match the encoded input to corresponding semantic 
representations (i.e., decoding) in order to decipher, so to say, what the speaker 
means. However, the code alone does not suffice to arrive at speaker meaning: not 
everything that the speaker means is encoded and there is no guarantee that the hearer 
interprets what she means correctly (Wilson and Sperber 1991b: 584-585; Sperber 
and Wilson 1995: 27). 
Hearers have to segment sounds and delimit words; parse and disambiguate 
constituents; narrow or broaden concepts; assign reference to some expressions; 
recover elided linguistic material; determine the attitude the speaker projects towards 
the proposition expressed, her degree of certainty about it or if she is performing a 
certain action, and supply any assumption that is necessary for arriving at implicit 
contents. All these tasks rely on inference, so Sperber and Wilson (1987: 698, 1995: 
10) opt for describing communication as an ostensive-inferential activity. It is 
‘ostensive’ because the speaker shows something to the hearer –an utterance, which 
is indirect evidence for her communicative intention– and uses it to attract and direct 
the hearer’s attention to something: her informative intention. Communication is 
‘inferential’ because the hearer has to work out the speaker’s meaning and her 
underlying intention when drawing the hearer’s attention2.  
Grice (1957, 1975) emphasised the reliance of communication on inference, but 
he envisaged its role as limited to the determination of the spatio-temporal 
coordinates of an utterance, assignment of reference to some expressions and 
recovery of the implicit contents. Accordingly, hearers arrive at ‘what is said’ 
through decoding and very little inference, while arriving at ‘what is implied’ greatly 
depend on inference. This unveils a view of the role of semantics and pragmatics in 
communication in which the former contributes to the recovery of the proposition 
expressed, while the latter was crucial for arriving at implicit contents (Wilson and 
Sperber 1993: 3). On the contrary, by proving that inference intervenes in all the 
                                                          
2
 As a cognitive-pragmatic model, relevance theory focuses on comprehension and aims to 
account for how hearers arrive at speaker’s meaning through a series of simultaneous 
inferential tasks. This should not mean that Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) are not aware of 
the crucial role that inference plays in production. 
tasks listed above, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) present a more intricate picture 
of comprehension where pragmatic processes are indispensable for the recovery of 
explicit content. 
Showing that communication involves much more than an encoding-decoding 
process also leads Sperber and Wilson to contend that individuals may use utterances 
in order not to simply pack and send over their own thoughts. By means of utterances 
communicators may reproduce words or phrases, represent diverse states of affairs 
and even allude to the thoughts of other people. 
 
 
1.5. Utterances as metarepresentations 
 
Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) believe that individuals can employ any natural or 
artificial phenomenon in order to represent another phenomenon it somehow 
resembles in certain respects. By means of utterances, which are public 
representations –i.e., perceptible, audible– individuals represent their own private, 
mental representations. Moreover, utterances may represent existing or desirable 
states of affairs or the thoughts or representations that an individual thinks another 
individual, or group of individuals, entertains. This is the basis for Sperber and 
Wilson’s (1995: 228-232) distinction between descriptive and interpretive 
dimensions of language usage.  
Since utterances are representations of representations, they have 
metarepresentational uses (Noh 2000). One of these is metalinguistic, when 
utterances publicly reproduce other public representations like words, phrases or 
utterances, or their logical or conceptual content. Clear examples are direct speech 
and quotations. Another metarepresentational use is interpretive, when utterances 
publicly resemble other public or private representations, like other utterances or 
thoughts. A typical example is indirect speech.  
Furthermore, if utterances metarepresent the thoughts or utterances that (an)other 
individual(s) entertain(s) or say(s), they are used attributively or function as 
attributive metarepresentations, as the source of those thoughts or utterances can be 
identified more or less easily (Wilson 1999: 148). In contrast, if utterances only 
represent a word, phrase or sentence produced by an unidentifiable source, they work 
as non-attributive metarepresentations. Examples of non-attributive 
metarepresentations are (Wilson and Sperber 1988; Wilson 1999): 
a) Negative and disjunctive sentences, which metarepresent possible 
information or thoughts. 
b) Interrogative and exclamative sentences. These metarepresent desirable 
information or thoughts. Interrogatives are requests for information if the 
speaker metarepresents an answer that the hearer can give, while they are 
offers of information if the speaker metarepresents an answer that she can 
give to the hearer.  
c) Imperative sentences. If the speaker metarepresents a state of affairs as 
desirable from her own viewpoint, they work as requests; if she 
metarepresents a state of affairs as desirable from the hearer’s viewpoint, 
they work as suggestions. 
 When metarepresenting another individual’s thoughts or words, the speaker may 
also express an attitude to them, so the utterance becomes echoic. The attitudes that 
the speaker may express are numerous, as she may “[...] indicate that she agrees or 
disagrees with the original, is puzzled, angry, amused, intrigued, sceptical, etc.; or 
any combination of these” (Wilson 1999: 147). However, three attitudes seem to be 
essential for understanding some types of utterances: endorsing, questioning and 
dissociative/rejecting. This last one is characteristic of irony, which Sperber and 
Wilson (1986/1995) analyse as a case of echoic attributive metarepresentation. An 
utterance is interpreted as ironic if the hearer identifies (i) that the speaker echoes 
her own or somebody else’s thoughts or words, (ii) the source of those thoughts or 
words and (iii) that the speaker dissociates from or rejects those thoughts or words. 
This analysis of irony contrasts with both the classical and Gricean definitions, as 
well as with other more recent treatments in pragmatics and psychology. 
Understanding utterances, then, involves much more than identifying words or 
arranging these in constituents. Hearers have to adjust concepts, assign reference, 
recover material that is not overtly present and, very importantly, determine the 
attitude the speaker projects towards what she says or whether what the speaker says 
is her own thoughts or somebody else’s thoughts. As pointed out, all these tasks rely 
on inference, so Sperber and Wilson depict comprehension as a process in which the 
constant search for relevance causes the human make various inferences at the same 
time and at an incredibly fast pace. 
 
 
1.6. A new picture of comprehension 
 
Decoding only yields a set of conceptual representations or logical form, which is 
not fully propositional and needs enriching through inference. Inferential enrichment 
amounts to performing (some of) the tasks listed above and results in the explicature 
of an utterance. This is the explicit content communicated by an utterance. This 
content can be related to any information that the hearer thinks that the speaker 
intends or expects him to access –i.e., implicated premises– in order to arrive at some 
implicated content –i.e., implicated conclusions. Both implicated premises and 
conclusions amount to the utterance implicit content and are often alluded to by the 
umbrella term ‘implicatures’. These are strong if the hearer has enough evidence to 
think that the speaker expects him to access or draw them, and weak if the hearer 
lacks enough evidence, so they may be contents that the speaker derives at his own 
responsibility (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 199-200). 
The comprehension or pragmatic module does not perform all these inferential 
tasks sequentially, but holistically3. It processes linguistic input and generates 
interpretative hypotheses by simultaneously decoding, considering possible 
disambiguations, conceptual adjustments and reference-assignments; looking for 
elided constituents, constructing possible speech-act or propositional-attitude 
descriptions, searching for implicated premises and anticipating possible implicated 
conclusions. As a result, utterance comprehension can be described as a process of 
mutual adjustment of both explicit and implicit content (Carston 2002; Wilson and 
Sperber 2002, 2004). Whether its outcomes is one or another depends on 
considerations about which option might result in a satisfactory number of cognitive 
effects in exchange of a reasonable amount of cognitive effort. This means that the 
pragmatic module does not search for the most relevant outcome, which would 
involve constructing all the possible interpretative hypotheses and assessing them.  
From this picture of comprehension follows the relevance-theoretic 
comprehension heuristics, which captures how the mind works in comprehension. 
Accordingly, hearers follow the path of least effort when adjusting explicit and 
implicit content of utterances, thus formulating interpretative hypotheses, and stop 
when their expectations of relevance are satisfied (Wilson 1999: 136; Wilson and 
Sperber 2002, 2004: 612). It is reasonable for hearers to do so because they will 
normally expect speakers, depending on their abilities and preferences, to formulate 
utterances in an easy and straightforward manner (Wilson and Sperber 2002: 259). 
Since relevance decreases as cognitive effort increases, hearers will very likely 
regard a particular interpretative hypothesis as intended if they can easily construct 
it. Moreover, it is reasonable for hearers to stop when an interpretative hypothesis 
satisfies their expectations of relevance because there should only be one optimally 
relevant interpretation. Two (or more) optimally relevant interpretations would 
detract from optimal relevance, as hearers will have to invest the additional effort to 
assess them4. 
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 Like other modules, it has a very specific domain of action, is mandatory and works in a fast 
and frugal manner (Fodor 1983). 
4
 See Allot (2002) for a discussion on rationality and the relevance-theoretic comprehension 
procedure. 
 1.7. A new conception of the role of the speaker 
 
The very nature of inference does not guarantee that the outcome of mutual 
adjustment is the expected or intended one. The audience may misunderstand the 
speaker if they fail at any of the tasks involved (Yus Ramos 1999a, 1999b). 
However, communicators may guide the audience to the intended interpretations by 
means of their linguistic or expressive choices, thus ensuring that the audience 
understand them correctly. Style is therefore seen by Sperber and Wilson (1995: 219) 
as consequence of the communicator’s willingness to be optimally relevant and 
assist the audience in comprehension. Speakers may take advantage of linguistic 
repertoires in order to generate specific cognitive effects that hearers could not 
obtain otherwise.  
Formulations of a specific message that turn out indirect, lengthy, repetitive, and 
probably costlier in terms of processing effort, may evidence the speaker’s desire to 
communicate (a wide array of) weak implicatures that contribute to optimal 
relevance. Among those implicatures, hearers may deduce information about how 
the speaker feels about a particular state of affairs, the reasons why the speaker 
phrases her message in a particular manner, how she treats the audience, their social 
relationship, etc. Weak implicatures like those would be of a behavioural nature 
(Jary 2013) and their derivation is essential for understanding phenomena like 
(im)politeness or literary communication (Pilkington 2000). 
 
 
1.8. The conceptual/procedural distinction 
 
Communication may now be metaphorically described as a ball where the speaker 
initially takes the lead in her conversational turn and then passes it to the hearer, who 
will take it in his turn and pass it back to the speaker again. As this exchange of turns 
takes place, meaning progressively emerges and is confirmed or negotiated. 
Although speakers and hearers collaborate in the joint endeavor of co-constructing 
meaning, the former can also assist the latter in their interpretative tasks.  
Speakers can direct hearers’ attention to specific sets of assumptions, or bring to 
the fore those they expect hearers to exploit, by means of the conceptual items in 
utterances. Thus, speakers help hearers select the mental context wherein to interpret 
what is said and, if necessary, figure out the premises necessary to arrive at implicit 
contents. On the other hand, speakers can also indicate how hearers should assign 
reference to some expressions, relate diverse items of information or construct 
adequate descriptions capturing their attitude to the proposition expressed, their 
degree of (un)certainty about it or what they intend to achieve with their words. This 
is possible because a variety of linguistic elements encode procedural meaning: 
instructions that the comprehension module follows when computing information, 
which somehow impose constraints on inferences.  
The distinction between conceptual and procedural expressions has been another 
major contribution of relevance theory and has led a number of scholars to analyse 
a series of expressions accordingly. Nouns, verbs and adjectives encode conceptual 
content, even if that content is amenable to subsequent adjustment resulting in what 
is known as ad hoc concepts: one-off, occasion-specific concepts. In contrast, 
discourse markers encode procedures that indicate the relationships between specific 
propositions and, therefore, steer the comprehension module toward one direction or 
another. The notion of procedural meaning enables practitioners in relevance-
theoretic pragmatics to overcome drawbacks of the Gricean distinction between 
conversational and conventional implicatures, the latter of which were thought to 
result from the linguistically encoded material. 
Some procedural elements like proper names and personal pronouns encode 
some conceptual content, even if schematic (Wilson and Sperber 1993)5. That 
conceptual content is integrated in the lower-level explicatures of an utterance 
together with the concepts encoded by other words. In contrast, the conceptual 
content of other expressions like attitudinal adverbials (e.g., ‘happily’, 
‘unfortunately’), illocutionary adverbials (e.g., ‘frankly’, ‘seriously’), evidential 
adverbials (e.g., ‘obviously’, ‘evidently’), hearsay adverbials (e.g., ‘allegedly’, 
‘reportedly’), and some parenthetical expressions (e.g., ‘they say’, ‘I hear’) becomes 
part of higher-level explicatures. While attitudinal and illocutionary adverbials 
indicate to hearers the sort of attitudinal description under which they must embed 
the proposition expressed, evidential and hearsay adverbials and parenthetical 
elements indicate whether the speaker has or lacks adequate evidence about the 
information dispensed (Wilson and Sperber 1993; Wilson 1999). 
 
 
2. Research within relevance-theoretic pragmatics 
 
In a paper published on the occasion of the first decade of relevance theory –the title 
of this chapter is clearly inspired by it– Yus Ramos (1998) extensively reviewed the 
contributions made by relevance theorists thus far. The publication of the theory was 
followed by some special issues in journals (e.g. Smith and Wilson 1992; Wilson 
and Smith 1993; Mateo Martínez and Yus Ramos 1998). An edited collection 
presented diverse applications and implications to understand irony, metaphor, 
metonymy, hearsay particles, some adverbials or scalar implicatures (Carston and 
Uchida 1998), while another presented in-depth analyses of the 
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 Note, however, that some authors consider pronouns to be purely procedural items (e.g., 
Scott, in press). 
conceptual/procedural distinction, intonation, focus phenomena, semantically 
underdetermined linguistic forms or the role of pragmatic inference (Rouchota and 
Jucker 1998). The theory was also applied to literary communication (e.g., 
Pilkington 1991, 1992), media discourse (e.g., Yus Ramos 1995, 1997, 1998), 
translation (e.g., Gutt 1989, 1991) or humour (e.g., Jodłowiec 1991; Curcó 1995, 
1996, 1997; Yus Ramos 1997, 1998). And a notable bulk of research centred on 
grammar and discourse, addressing issues such as: 
- discourse markers (e.g., Blakemore 1987, 1988, 1989; Jucker 1993; 
Moeschler 1993; Rouchota 1995);  
- different types of adverbials and particles (e.g., Blass 1989, 1990; Ifantidou 
1992, 1993; Itani 1994; Imai 1998);  
- mood (e.g., Wilson and Sperber 1988, 1993; Clark 1993; Rouchota 1994) 
and modality (e.g., Berbeira Gardón 1993, 1998; Groefsema 1995);   
- tense and aspect (e.g., Moeschler 1993; Wilson and Sperber 1993), or  
- reformulations (Blakemore 1992, 1993, 1994).  
Research from a relevance-theoretic perspective has continued with renewed 
enthusiasm and a vivid impetus. The prominence given to the role of inference in the 
determination of the explicit content of utterances led Carston (2002) to collect and 
profoundly revise a series of her most illuminating works on the pragmatics of 
explicit communication. Her ideas were also celebrated years later with the 
publication of another volume that showed their explanatory potential (Soria and 
Romero 2010). Quite similarly, the evolution of the theory subsequently encouraged 
other scholars to revisit issues like literary communication (Pilkington 2000; Unger 
2006), evidentiality (Ifantidou 2001), particles (Iten 2002), humour (Yus Ramos 
2003, 2008, 2013, 2016; Solska 2012), discourse markers (Blakemore 2002; Hall 
2007), figurative speech (Vega Moreno 2007), intonation or paralanguage (Wilson 
and Wharton 2006; Wharton 2009). The resulting adjustments of the theory have 
also been presented in a series of works by Wilson and Sperber (2002, 2004, 2012).  
Later innovations, applications and suggestions for further research have also 
been included in some manuals, which make the theory accessible to students and 
novel researchers (e.g., Blakemore 1992; Yus Ramos 1997; Clark 2013). For the 
sake of exemplification, suffice it to mention those in areas like: 
- misunderstanding (e.g., Yus Ramos 1999a, 1999b; Jodłowiec 2008) and 
pragmatic failure (e.g., Padilla Cruz 2013a, 2014);  
- phatic communion (e.g., Žegarac 1998; Žegarac and Clark 1999a, 1999b; 
Padilla Cruz 2005a, 2007a, 2007b); 
- (im)politeness (e.g., Escandell Vidal 1996, 1998; Jary 1998a, 1998b, 2013); 
- historical linguistics (e.g., Ruiz Moneva 1997; Padilla Cruz 2003, 2005b);  
- language acquisition, pragmatic competence and interlanguage pragmatic 
development (e.g., Padilla Cruz 2013b; Ifantidou 2014);  
- computer-mediated communication (e.g., Yus Ramos 2001, 2010, 2011); 
- expressive meaning (e.g., Moeschler 2009; Blakemore 2011; Piskorska 
2012a); 
- communication disorders and clinical pragmatics (e.g., Papp 2006; 
Leinonen and Ryder 2008; Wearing 2010), or  
- the relationship between epistemic vigilance and understanding (e.g., 
Mascaro and Sperber 2009; Sperber et al. 2010; Padilla Cruz 2012; 
Mazzarella 2013, 2015).  
The latest directions relevance theory has taken can also be seen in other more 
recent edited collections. These gather works which delve into the 
conceptual/procedural distinction, the nature and role of ad hoc concepts, lexical 
pragmatics, the role of context and metarepresentation, the role of valence, phatic 
communion, focal stress, the interactions of modality and evidentiality with 
epistemic vigilance, humour, (im)politeness, miscommunication, interjections and 
response cries, various speech acts, emotions, implicit communication, translation 
or style (Mioduszewska 2004; Korzeniowska and Grzegorzewska 2005; 
Wałaszewska, Kisielewska-Krysiuk and Piskorska 2010; Escandell Vidal, Leonetti 
and Ahern 2011; Piskorska 2012b; Wałaszewska and Piskorska 2012; Wałaszewska 
2015). Finally, one more volume will soon present new applications to computer-
mediated discourse, psychotherapeutic discourse, literary discourse, humorous 
discourse, lexical pragmatics or morphology (Wałaszewska and Piskorska, in press).  
The list of topics and references given here is obviously far from exhaustive, but 
it seeks to give an idea of the impressive amount of work done or in progress, to 
which the chapters gathered in this book purport to add up. Readers will certainly 
gain access to more specific references in databases, bibliographic repositories or 
catalogues, as well as on the “Relevance Theory Online Bibliographic Service”. 
Created some years ago and monthly updated by Yus Ramos 
(http://personal.ua.es/francisco.yus/rt2.html), this service facilitates access to an 
immense number of works through an index of authors in alphabetical order or a list 
of thematic sections. 
 
 
 
3. This book 
 
This collection is divided in four parts on the basis of common thematic threads: 
procedural meaning, discourse issues, interpretive processes, and the rhetorical and 
perlocutionary effects of communication. Although, as shown in the preceding 
section, the range of interests of relevance theorists is quite wide, the parts in which 
this volume is divided address topics that have traditionally intrigued them and areas 
where significant contributions and progresses are being made. Moreover, although 
the chapters in each part delve into specific issues or phenomena, they have different 
orientations and implications for fields as diverse as linguistic description, 
morphology, machine translation, rhetoric and argumentation, or interlanguage 
pragmatic development.  
 
 
3.1. Issues on procedural meaning and procedural analyses 
 
The first part groups four papers that rely on the notion of procedural meaning. The 
first two papers look into the interaction of procedural elements with intonation, thus 
broadening the scope of procedural analyses, while the third paper presents what can 
be considered a traditional relevance-theoretic procedural analysis of some linguistic 
elements in an African language, thus contributing to its description. Finally, one 
paper explores the procedural meaning of verbal tenses and shows the usefulness of 
procedural analyses for a field like machine translation.  
The first chapter is “The speaker’s derivational intention”, by Thorstein 
Fretheim. Based on the notion of derivational intention, which alludes to the route 
the audience should follow in order to reach the content of the speaker’s informative 
intention, this chapter shows the usefulness of that notion and argues that it cannot 
be separated from that of informative intention. Fretheim claims that the speaker’s 
derivational intention is constrained by encoded conceptual semantics and encoded 
procedural semantics alike. However, a given piece of procedural information may 
be at odds with the speaker’s derivational intention in a given context, and hence 
with her informative intention. Accordingly, he contends that the procedural 
meaning encoded by one expression may override and set aside the procedural 
meaning encoded by a co-occurring expression, if there is an intuitively felt conflict 
between the constraints on interpretation that the two expressions encode. In such 
cases, the more powerful procedural constraint is consonant with the speaker’s 
derivational intention and the less powerful procedural constraint is not.  
By means of two sections on the pragmatic functions of certain intonational 
phenomena in Norwegian, Fretheim illustrates how native speakers differently 
ranked co-occurring procedural constraints on pragmatic interpretation. This caused 
their audience to adhere to the procedural information conveyed by the expression 
with the higher rank and to disregard the information coming from the more 
modestly ranked encoder of procedural meaning. The first section reports on results 
from a listening comprehension experiment. It showed that the more highly ranked 
procedural constraint prevailed. The second section discusses the extent to which 
Optimality Theory may be a suitable framework for handling conflicts between co-
occurring procedural constraints. 
The second chapter is “Cracking the chestnut: How intonation interacts with 
procedural meaning in Colloquial Singapore English lah”, by Lee Junwen and Kim 
Chonghyuck. Also assuming that procedural meaning may interact with intonation, 
it looks into the different pragmatic functions of this particle, which are argued to 
result from the interaction between its unitary semantic meaning and the effect of 
pitch. This chapter questions previous analyses of this particle as a marker of 
solidarity, warmth or informality, attenuation or emphasis, assertion or 
accommodation. Due to the variety of pitch contours with which this particle can be 
pronounced, it had generally been regarded as either a set of homonymic variants, 
or as a unitary particle with a monolithic meaning despite tonal differences.  
For Junwen and Chonghyuck, ‘lah’ describes the preceding proposition as being 
of high strength. The falling tone characteristic of declaratives leads the hearer to 
interpret that proposition as referring to an actual situation, while the rising tone 
characteristic of interrogatives leads him to interpret it as alluding to a desirable 
thought. The various pragmatic functions ascribable to ‘lah’ then arise as a 
consequence of processing. Additionally, this chapter accounts for a particularly 
troublesome phenomenon: the ability of ‘lah’ to pragmatically strengthen 
declaratives but to weaken imperatives. Through the chapter, its authors show that 
relevance theory provides a useful framework for analysing the effect of intonation 
on the processing of this discourse particle, which opens up new ways of 
characterising other particles in Singapore English. 
In “Reference assignment in pronominal argument languages: A relevance-
theoretic perspective”, Helga Schröder adheres to the relevance-theoretic view that 
reference assignment is part of the process of explicature construction and that 
pronominal expressions procedurally constrain it (Wilson and Sperber 1993; Sperber 
and Wilson 1995). By instructing hearers to pick out a reference, pronominals 
contribute to the computational side of comprehension. Based on data from Toposa, 
an Eastern Nilotic language spoken in South Sudan, and Kiswahili, spoken in Kenya, 
Shröeder demonstrates that two procedures are involved in reference assignment in 
African pronominal argument languages: an incorporated pronoun in the verb helps 
identify the referent, while that pronoun in the verb helps an attributive expression 
achieve referential status. 
Quite often, African languages do not mark their nominal expressions for 
definiteness or indefiniteness, so they enter the conversation as undetermined. 
Disambiguation of such expressions requires pragmatic enrichment. Those 
languages seem to follow a ‘double-strategy’ in terms of reference assignment. 
Pronominals can be marked in the verb or occur independently. Independent 
pronouns do not encode procedural information guiding the selection of the correct 
referent, whereas incorporated pronouns do. Processing independent pronouns, 
Schröeder concludes, requires extra effort but yields cognitive effects related to 
focus identification and contrastive focus. 
The last paper in this part has an empirical orientation and combines corpus work 
and linguistic experiments. In “Conceptual and procedural information for verb tense 
disambiguation: The English simple past”, Cristina Grisot, Bruno Cartoni and 
Jacques Moeschler seek to elucidate which features should be included in a model 
explaining and predicting cross-linguistic variation in the translation of tenses. Thus, 
the authors also try to explain how a source language verb tenses may be 
disambiguated in order to choose from among different translation possibilities and 
which features could contribute to improving the output of Statistical Machine 
Translation systems. 
Corpus analysis reveals a lack of correspondence between English and French 
tenses. One of the most frequent divergences is that of the English simple past. Its 
semantic and pragmatic domains may be rendered in French through three tenses: 
passé composé, passé simple and imparfait. The authors assume that the conceptual 
and procedural contents of the English simple past can be used as disambiguation 
criteria in order to search for a French equivalent. They test this hypothesis through 
annotation experiments, whose results partially confirm their hypothesis.  
 
 
3.2. Discourse issues 
 
The two chapters in the second part of this book are connected by the fact that they 
address discourse. While the first chapter deals with the clues that hearers can rely 
on in order to perceive discourse as ironical, the second one analyses how specific 
manifestations of discourse, namely, rhetorical and ironical questions, may be 
distinguished. Obviously, these two chapters are further connected by the fact that 
they address irony from a relevance-theoretic perspective. 
Francisco Yus Ramos had previously argued that irony comprehension involves 
the simultaneous or sequential activation of one or several contextual sources. A 
successful activation of these sources, especially the saturation of information that 
they may give rise to, leads to the so-called “criterion of optimal accessibility to 
irony”. Also, the simultaneous or sequential activation of these sources generates a 
number of prototypical cases in the comprehension of irony. This view of irony, the 
author thinks, is fully compatible with the extant relevance-theoretic approach based 
on the idea that irony is a case of echoic metarepresentational use of language, in 
which the speaker expresses a dissociative attitude towards certain words or thoughts 
attributable to some other (group of) individual(s).  
 In “Relevance theory and contextual sources-centred analysis of irony: Current 
research and compatibility”, Francisco Yus Ramos has two aims. On the one hand, 
he checks whether those prototypical cases of irony are still valid and do cover all 
the possible ironic situations, together with the introduction of a more fine-grained 
notion of narrowed cognitive environment. On the other hand, he assesses to what 
extent his approach fits the latest relevance-theoretic research on irony such as the 
one involving different types of metarepresentation that are activated in successful 
irony comprehension. 
Next, “Distinguishing rhetorical from ironical questions: A relevance-theoretic 
account”, by Thierry Raeber, aims to offer criteria for differentiating rhetorical from 
ironical questions. Some of their features have been conflated on the grounds of the 
interpretative effects ironical questions seem to yield. Indeed, ironical questions 
have often been regarded as subtypes of rhetorical questions (Bonhomme 2005), or 
vice versa, rhetorical questions have been considered as subtypes of ironical 
questions (Gibbs 2000) owing to the obvious answer they call for, their persuasive 
power and the cognitive effects they result in.  
However, Raeber suggests that rhetorical and ironical questions are to be 
distinguished because the former implicitly assert a proposition bearing relevance – 
in most cases the answer itself or its consequences– while such implicit proposition, 
though manifest to the hearer, is not relevant at all by itself in ironical questions. The 
proposition implicitly rhetorical questions assert is recoverable thanks to a biased 
choice of answer. In contrast, ironical questions exhibit their in-context inaccuracy, 
thus giving rise to specific effects resulting from the contextual absurdity of 
pragmatic expectations, which are to be mobilized in order to motivate the question. 
Accordingly, Raeber proposes that failure at satisfying the hearer’s expectations of 
relevance triggers the attitudinal, non-propositional effects associated with ironical 
questions. 
 
 
3.3. Interpretive processes 
 
The third part of the book includes two chapters that consider interpretation. While 
the first one centres on the interpretive processes by learners of a second language, 
the second one analyses how different linguistic elements are put to work in order to 
guide interpretation. The first chapter shows that relevance theory has significant 
implications for, and very helpful applications to, the field of interlanguage 
pragmatics. The second chapter, in turn, offers interesting insights into evidentials. 
Furthermore, both chapters are connected by the fact that, although in different 
domains, they take into account the role of epistemic vigilance mechanisms. These 
mechanisms have recently started to attract the interest of relevance theorists and are 
currently receiving due attention from them, as these works show. 
Assuming that little attention has been paid to the cognitive underpinnings of L2 
learners’ pragmatic competence, Elly Ifantidou addresses the role of vigilance 
mechanisms in interlanguage pragmatic development in “Relevance theory, 
epistemic vigilance and pragmatic competence”. The author evaluates the effect of 
explicit pragmatic instruction in an EFL academic context and of language 
proficiency on learners’ metapragmatic awareness. This is an empirical study which 
considers different conditions of treatment, as determined by type of pragmatic input 
and level of language proficiency. It compares data from three groups of 
undergraduate students of English Language and Literature, which are used as 
control and experimental groups. 
Through newspaper editorials, Ifantidou examines how learners may exercise 
epistemic vigilance towards the source of information and thus avoid being 
accidentally or intentionally misinformed. In the metapragmatic awareness task she 
administered, learners relied on (i) relevance-theoretic mechanisms for 
comprehension of content and search for relevance, and (ii) epistemic vigilance for 
acceptance of both the content and source of communicated information. Since 
understanding is a precondition, even though not sufficient, for believing (Sperber 
et al. 2010: 368; Wilson 2010), learners’ pragmatic competence may benefit from 
sophisticated mindreading if they exercise epistemic vigilance towards the 
informant’s (i.e., newspaper journalist’s) epistemic states (e.g., acceptance, doubt, 
rejection) and intentions (e.g., to inform, to mislead). Therefore, the development of 
L2 learners’ pragmatic competence is contingent on the development of their 
epistemic vigilance mechanisms. 
The second paper analyses the interaction of epistemic vigilance with genre and 
evidentials –i.e., grammatical elements indicating the type of evidence the speaker 
has for making a statement. Authored by Christoph Unger, “Evidentials, genre and 
epistemic vigilance” shows that existing accounts have mainly explored the 
contribution of these elements to comprehension of speaker’s meaning. However, 
communicators may exploit evidentials in order to indicate that they are competent 
in distinguishing their information sources (Wilson 2011). Hence, evidentials help 
communicators portray themselves as trustworthy individuals and enable the 
audience to evaluate the evidential status of the communicated information. 
Drawing from Wilson (2011), Unger argues that evidentials may be used as genre 
indicators. Indeed, Aikhenvald (2004) had shown that reported evidentials very often 
appear in traditional narratives. This suggests that reported evidentials and 
traditional narrative genres may be conventionally related. Accordingly, the author 
contends that, as opposed to general markers of metarepresentational use and other 
indicators of information source, true reported evidentials raise the activation of a 
whole array of cognitive mechanisms specialised in checking support and coherence 
of the communicated content with existing beliefs. Furthermore, the relevance of 
traditional narratives resides in the validity of cultural values or norms 
communicated through exemplification. For this reason, the processing of such 
narratives strongly engages the argumentation module, whose activation is raised by 
reported evidentials. 
 
 
3.4. Rhetorical and perlocutionary effects of communication 
 
Before closing this book with additional directions for future research, two chapters 
discuss the effects of communication from a relevance-theoretic angle.  
The first chapter in this part also discusses the role of epistemic vigilance in 
argumentation, thus linking this part to the preceding one. “Rhetoric and cognition: 
Pragmatic constraints on argument processing” adopts a cognitive-pragmatic 
perspective on rhetorical effectiveness in order to hypothesise that the information-
selection mechanisms in interpretation positively influence the outcome of 
subsequent argumentative evaluation. Moreover, author Steve Oswald moves for the 
inclusion of a cognitive-pragmatic component in a theory of argumentation, which 
has typically refrained from adopting cognitive standpoints (van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 2004: 74). Indeed, individuals need to understand arguments before 
evaluating them, which makes comprehension, to some extent at least, responsible 
for the selection of premises that will constitute the input to the evaluative stage of 
argumentation. Accordingly, arguers who want to convince their audience can be 
said to seek to constrain their interpretative processes so that they only presumably 
select ‘rhetorically-friendly’ contextual premises. 
Rhetorical effectiveness is defined as the propensity for an argument to ensure 
that its conclusion appears to be optimally relevant with respect to its premises. In 
other words, successful arguments are those whose conclusions (i) are derived with 
little effort and (ii) generate significant cognitive effects given a series of premises. 
This definition encompasses both cases of sound argumentation, where potential 
counter-arguments are weighed and dismissed as epistemically weaker than the 
argument under consideration, and cases of fallacious argumentation, whose success 
rests on the audience’s inability to mobilise counter-evidence and discard the 
argument as fallacious (Maillat and Oswald 2009, 2011; Oswald 2010, 2011). 
Fallacious moves are therefore seen as attempts to manipulate those two conditions 
by making ‘rhetorically-friendly’ assumptions epistemically strong and accessible, 
and ‘rhetorically-unfriendly’ assumptions weak and less accessible. 
In turn, the second chapter focuses on perlocutionary effects, which should not 
be merely understood as consequences of the comprehension process, but as 
phenomena influencing the way communicated stimuli are actually processed. 
“Perlocutionary effects and relevance theory”, by Agnieszka Piskorska, narrows 
down the traditional Austinian definition of perlocution and confines it to 
intentionally evoked mental states, which may have a cognitive or affective nature. 
Although the notion of ‘perlocution’ was initially alien to relevance theory, there has 
recently been a growing interest in the speech-act theoretic concept (e.g., Jary 2010; 
see also Witczak-Plisiecka 2013 for a review). Sharing this interest, Piskorska briefly 
overviews relevance-theoretic insights into speech acts, such as its reductionism of 
speech act types or its account of illocutionary force in terms of procedural meaning. 
Then, she presents arguments supporting her claim.  
The main one is that on many occasions effects like amusement, 
warning/threatening or offending are the reasons why individuals interact. If 
relevance is assessed solely in terms of positive cognitive effects, something 
important is missing. Indeed, extant relevance-theoretic analyses of politeness 
phenomena (Escandell Vidal 1998, 2004) and metaphor (Pilkington 2010) question 
the view that meaning equals the sum of explicatures and implicatures. Emotion and 
cognition must be integrated in pragmatic analyses of meaning and its consequences, 
as argued in (neuro)psychology (e.g., Damasio 1994). Therefore, Piskorska makes 
two suggestions about the relationship between comprehension and affective states, 
which are consistent with the massive modularity model of the mind (Sperber 2005). 
Nevertheless, experiments on the role of perlocutions are needed, although their 
results could be limited due to the difficulties at modelling actual emotions in 
experimental settings. 
 
 
References 
 
Aikhenvald, Alexandra. Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
Allot, Nicholas E. “Relevance and Rationality”. UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 
14 (2002): 69-82. 
Apperly, Ian. Mindreaders. The Cognitive Basis of Theory of Mind. New York: 
Psychology Press, 2012. 
Berbeira Gardón, José L. “Posibilidad epistémica, posibilidad radical y pertinencia”. 
Pragmalingüística 1 (1993): 53-78. 
Berbeira Gardón, José L. “Relevance and modality”. Revista Alicantina de Estudios 
Ingleses 11 (1998): 3-22. 
Blakemore, Diane. Semantic Constraints on Relevance. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1987. 
Blakemore, Diane. “’So’ as a constraint on relevance”. In Mental Representations. 
The Interface between Language and Reality, edited by Ruth M. Kempson, 183-
195. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
Blakemore, Diane. “Denial and contrast: A relevance theoretic analysis of but”. 
Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1989): 15-37. 
Blakemore, Diane. Understanding Utterances. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
Blakemore, Diane. “The relevance of reformulations”. Language and Literature 2 
(1993): 101-120. 
Blakemore, Diane. “Relevance, poetic effects and social goals: A reply to Culpeper”. 
Language and Literature 3 (1994): 49-59. 
Blakemore, Diane. Relevance and Linguistic Meaning. The Semantics and 
Pragmatics of Discourse Markers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002. 
Blakemore, Diane. “On the descriptive ineffability of expressive meaning”. Journal 
of Pragmatics 43/14 (2011): 3537-3550. 
Blass, Regina. “Pragmatic effects of co-ordination: The case of ‘and’ in Sissala”. 
UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 1 (1989): 32-51. 
Blass, Regina. Relevance Relations in Discourse: A Study with Special Reference to 
Sissala. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Bonhomme, M. 2005. “Flou et polyvalence de la question rhétorique: 
L’exemple des fables de La Fontaine”. In Les états de la question, edited 
by C. Rossari et al., 191-209. Québec: Nota Bene. 
Carston, Robyn. Thoughts and Utterances. The Pragmatics of Explicit 
Communication. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. 
Carston, Robyn and Seiji Uchida (eds.). Relevance Theory. Applications and 
Implications. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1998. 
Clark, Billy. “Let and let’s: Procedural encoding and explicature”. Lingua 90 (1993): 
173-200. 
Clark, Billy. Relevance Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
Curcó, Carmen. “Some observations on the pragmatics of humorous interpretations: 
A relevance theoretic approach”. UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 7 (1995): 
27-47. 
Curcó, Carmen. “The implicit expression of attitudes, mutual manifestness, and 
verbal humour”. UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 8 (1996): 89-99. 
Curcó, Carmen. The Pragmatics of Humorous Interpretations: A Relevance-
Theoretic Approach. PhD diss., University of London, 1997. 
Damasio, Antonio R. Descartes’ Error. New York: Putnam, 1994. 
Eemeren, Frans van and Rob Grootendorst. A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. 
The Pragma-dialectical Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004. 
Escandell Vidal, M. Victoria. “Towards a cognitive approach to politeness”. 
Language Sciences 18 (1996): 629-650. 
Escandell Vidal, M. Victoria. “Politeness: A relevant issue for relevance theory”. 
Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 11 (1998): 45-57. 
Escandell Vidal, M. Victoria. “Norms and principles. Putting social and cognitive 
pragmatics together”. In Current Trends in the Pragmatics of Spanish, edited by 
Rosina Márquez-Reiter and M. Elena Placencia, 347-371. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins, 2004. 
Escandell Vidal, M. Victoria, Manuel Leonetti and Aoife Ahern (eds.). Procedural 
Meaning. Problems and Perspectives. Bingley: Emerald/Brill, 2011. 
Fodor, Jerry. The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983. 
Gibbs, R. W. 2000. “Irony in talk among friends”. Metaphor and symbol 
15: 5-27. 
Grice, Herbert P. “Meaning”. Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 377-388. 
Grice, Herbert P. “Logic and conversation”. In Syntax and Semantics vol. 3: Speech 
Acts, edited by Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan, 41-59. New York: Academic 
Press, 1975. 
Groefsema, Marjolein. “Can, may, must and should: A relevance theoretic account”. 
Journal of Linguistics 31 (1995): 53-79. 
Gutt, Ernst-August. “Translation and relevance”. UCL Working Papers in 
Linguistics 1 (1989): 75-94. 
Gutt, Ernst-August. Translation and Relevance. Cognition and Context. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1991. 
Hall, A. 2007. Do discourse connectives encode concepts or procedures? Lingua 
117(1): 149-174. 
Happé, Francesca G. E. “An advanced test of theory of mind: Understanding of story 
characters’ thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped, and 
normal children and adults”. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 
24/2 (1994): 129-154. 
Horn, Larry. “Presupposition and implicature”. In The Handbook of Contemporary 
Semantic Theory, edited by Shalom Lappin, 299-320. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. 
Ifantidou, Elly. “Sentential adverbs and relevance”. UCL Working Papers in 
Linguistics 4 (1992): 193-214. 
Ifantidou, Elly. “Parentheticals and relevance”. UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 
5 (1993): 193-210. 
Ifantidou, Elly. Evidentials and Relevance. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2001. 
Ifantidou, Elly. Pragmatic Competence and Relevance. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins, 2014. 
Imai, Kunihito. “Intonation and relevance”. In Relevance Theory. Applications and 
Implications, edited by Robyn Carston and Seiji Uchida, 69-86. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1998. 
Itani, Reiko. “A relevance-based analysis of hearsay particles: Japanese utterance-
final tte”. UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 6 (1994): 379-400. 
Iten, Corinne. Linguistic Meaning, Truth Conditions and Relevance. The Case of 
Concessives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 
Jary, Mark. “Is relevance theory asocial?” Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 
11 (1998a): 157-169. 
Jary, Mark. “Relevance theory and the communication of politeness”. Journal of 
Pragmatics 30 (1998b): 1-19. 
Jary, Mark. 2010. Assertion. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jary, Mark. “Two types of implicatures: Material and behavioural”. Mind & 
Language 28/5 (2013): 638-660. 
Jodłowiec, Maria. The Role of Relevance in the Interpretation of Verbal Jokes: A 
Pragmatic Analysis. PhD diss., Jagiellonian Uiversity, 1991. 
Jodłowiec, Maria. “What’s in the punchline?” In Relevant Worlds: Current 
Perspectives on Language, Translation and Relevance Theory, edited by Ewa 
Wałaszewska, Marta Kisielewska-Krysiuk, Aniela Korzeniowska and 
Małgorzata Grzegorzewska, 67-86. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2008. 
Jucker, Andreas H. “The discourse marker well: A relevance-theoretical account”. 
Journal of Pragmatics 19 (1993): 435-452. 
Korzeniowska, Aniela and Małgorzata Grzegorzewska (eds.). Relevance Studies in 
Poland. Vol. 2. Warsaw: University of Warsaw, 2005. 
Lakoff, Robin T. “The Logic of Politeness; or, Minding Your P’s and q’s”. In Papers 
from the Ninth Regional Meeting, edited by Claudia W. Corum, Thomas C. 
Smith-Stark and Ann Weiser, 292-305. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, 
1973. 
Leech, Geoffrey. Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman, 1983. 
Leekam, Susan R. “Jokes and lies: Children’s understanding of intentional 
falsehood”. In Natural theories of mind. Evolution, development and simulation 
of everyday mindreading, edited by Andrew Whiten, 159-174. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1991. 
Leinonen, Eeva and Nuala Ryder. “Relevance theory and language disorders”. In 
The Handbook of Clinical Linguistics, edited by Martin J. Ball, Michael Perkins, 
Nicole Müller and Sara Howard, . Oxford: Blackwell, 2008. 
Levinson, Stephen C. Presumptive Meanings. The Theory of Generalized 
Conversational Implicature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. 
Lewis, David. Convention. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1969. 
Maillat, Didier and Steve Oswald. “Defining manipulative discourse: the pragmatics 
of cognitive illusions”. International Review of Pragmatics 1/2 (2009): 348-370. 
Maillat, Didier and Steve Oswald. “Constraining context: A pragmatic account of 
cognitive manipulation”. In Critical Discourse Studies in Context and Cognition, 
edited by C. Hart, 65-80. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2011. 
Mascaro, Olivier and Dan Sperber. “The moral, epistemic, and mindreading 
components of children’s vigilance towards deception”. Cognition 112/3 (2009): 
367-380. 
Mateo Martínez, José and Francisco Yus Ramos. Special Issue on Relevance 
Theory. Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 11 (1998). 
Mazzarella, Diana. “‘Optimal relevance’ as a pragmatic criterion: The role of 
epistemic vigilance”. UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 25 (2013): 20-45. 
Mazzarella, Diana. 2015. 
Mioduszewska, Ewa (ed.). Relevance Studies in Poland. Vol. 1. Warszawa: 
University of Warsaw, 2004. 
Moeschler, Jacques. “Relevance and conversation”. Lingua 90 (1993): 149-171. 
Moeschler, Jacques. “Pragmatics, propositional and non-propositional effects: Can 
a theory of utterance interpretation account for emotions in verbal 
communication?" Social Science Information 48/3 (2009): 447-464. 
Noh, Eun-Ju. Metarepresentation. A Relevance-Theory Approach. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins, 2000. 
Oswald, Steve. Pragmatics of uncooperative and manipulative communication. PhD 
diss., University of Neuchâtel, 2010. 
Oswald, Steve. “From interpretation to consent: Arguments, beliefs and meaning”. 
Discourse Studies 13/6 (2011): 806-814. 
Padilla Cruz, Manuel. “A relevance theoretic approach to the introduction of 
Scandinavian pronouns in English”. In Interaction and Cognition in Linguistics, 
edited by Carlos Inchaurralde and Celia Florén, 123-134. Hamburg: Peter Lang, 
2003. 
Padilla Cruz, Manuel. “On the phatic interpretation of utterances: A complementary 
relevance-theoretic approach”. Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 18 
(2005a): 227-246. 
Padilla Cruz, Manuel. “Relevance theory and historical linguistics: Towards a 
pragmatic approach to the morphological changes in the preterite from Old 
English to Middle English”. Revista Canaria de Estudios Ingleses 51 (2005b): 
183-204. 
Padilla Cruz, Manuel. “Phatic utterances and the communication of social 
information”. In Studies in Intercultural, Cognitive and Social Pragmatics, 
edited by Pilar Garcés-Conejos Blitvich, Manuel Padilla Cruz, Reyes Gómez 
Morón and Lucía Fernández Amaya, 114-131. New Castle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007a. 
Padilla Cruz, Manuel. “Metarepresentations and phatic utterances: A pragmatic 
proposal about the generation of solidarity between interlocutors”. In Current 
Trends in Pragmatics, edited by Piotr Cap and Joanna Nijakowska, 110-128. 
New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007b. 
Padilla Cruz, Manuel. “Epistemic vigilance, cautious optimism and sophisticated 
understanding”. Research in Language 10/4 (2012): 365-386. 
Padilla Cruz, Manuel. “Understanding and overcoming pragmatic failure in 
intercultural communication: From focus on speakers to focus on hearers”. 
International Review of Applied Linguistics in Language Teaching 51/1 (2013a): 
23-54. 
Padilla Cruz, Manuel. “Metapsychological awareness of comprehension and 
epistemic vigilance of L2 communication in interlanguage pragmatic 
development”. Journal of Pragmatics 59/A (2013b): 117-135. 
Padilla Cruz, Manuel. “Pragmatic failure, epistemic injustice and epistemic 
vigilance”. Language & Communication 39 (2014): 34-50. 
Papp, Szilvia. “A relevance-theoretic account of the development and deficits of 
theory of mind in normally developing children and individuals with autism”. 
Theory & Psychology 16/2 (2006): 141-161. 
Pilkington, Adrian. “Poetic effects: A relevance theory perspective”. In Literary 
Pragmatics, edited by Roger D. Sell, 44-61. London: Routledge, 1991. 
Pilkington, Adrian. “Poetic effects”.  Lingua 87 (1992): 29-51. 
Pilkington, Adrian. Poetic Effects. A Relevance Theory Perspective. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins, 2000. 
Piskorska, Agnieszka. “Cognition and emotions – A joint effort at obtaining positive 
cognitive effects?” In Relevance Studies in Poland. Vol. 4. Essays on Language 
and Communication, edited by Agnieszka Piskorska, 102-111. Warsaw: WUW, 
2012a. 
Piskorska, Agnieszka (ed.). Relevance Studies in Poland. Vol. 4. Essays on 
Language and Communication. Warsaw: WUW, 2012b. 
Rouchota, Villy. “On indefinite descriptions”. Journal of Linguistics 30 (1994): 441-
475. 
Rouchota, Villy. “Discourse connectives: What do they link?” UCL Working Papers 
in Linguistics 7 (1995), 199-212. 
Rouchota, Villy and Andreas H. Jucker (eds.). Current Issues in Relevance Theory. 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1998. 
Ruiz Moneva, María A. “A relevance-theory approach to the Scandinavian influence 
upon the development of the English language”. Revista Alicantina de Estudios 
Ingleses 10 (1997): 183-191. 
Schiffer, Stephen. Meaning. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1972. 
Scott, K. In press. Pronouns and procedures: Reference and beyond. Lingua. 
Smith, Neil V. and Deirdre Wilson. Special Issue on Relevance Theory. Lingua 87 
(1992). 
Solska, Agnieszka. “Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure and processing 
multiple meanings in paradigmatic puns.” In Relevance Theory. More than 
Understanding, edited by Ewa  Wałaszewska and Agnieszka Piskorska, 167-
182. New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012. 
Soria, Belén and Esther Romero (eds.). Explicit Communication. Robyn Carston’s 
Pragmatics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Sperber, Dan. “Understanding verbal understanding”. In What is Intelligence? edited 
by Jean Khalifa, 179-198. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Sperber, D. “Modularity and relevance: How can a massively modular mind be 
flexible and context-sensitive?”. In The Innate Mind: Structure and Content, 
edited by Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence and Stepehn Stich, 53-68. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. Relevance. Communication and Cognition. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986. 
Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. “Précis of Relevance: Communication and 
Cognition” and “Authors’ Response”. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 10 
(1987): 697-710, 736-754. 
Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. Relevance. Communication and Cognition. 2nd 
edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995. 
Sperber, Dan, Fabrice Clément, Christophe Heintz, Olivier Mascaro, Hugo Mercier, 
Gloria Origgi and Deirdre Wilson. “Epistemic vigilance”. Mind and Language 
25/4 (2010): 359-393. 
Sullivan, Kate, Ellen Winner & Natalie Hopfield. 1995. How children 
tell a lie from a joke: The role of second-order mental state 
attributions. British Journal of Developmental Psychology 13(2). 
191-204. 
Sullivan, Kate, Ellen Winner and Helen Tager-Flugsber. “Can adolescents with 
Williams syndrome tell the difference between lies and jokes?” Developmental 
Neuropsychology 23/1-2 (2003): 85-103. 
Unger, Christoph. Genre, Relevance and Global Coherence. The Pragmatics of 
Discourse Type. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006. 
Vega Moreno, Rosa E. Creativity and Convention. The Pragmatics of Everyday 
Figurative Speech. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2007. 
Wałaszewska, Ewa. Relevance-theoretic Lexical Pragmatics. Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015. 
Wałaszewska, Ewa, Marta Kisielewska-Krysiuk and Agnieszka Piskorska (eds.). In 
the Mind and across Minds. A Relevance-Theoretic Perspective on 
Communication and Translation. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2010. 
Wałaszewska, Ewa and Agnieszka Piskorska (eds.). Relevance Theory. More than 
Understanding. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012. 
Wałaszewska, Ewa and Agnieszka Piskorska (eds.). From Discourse to Morphemes. 
Applications of Relevance Theory. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, in press. 
Wearing, Catherine. “Autism, metaphor and relevance theory.” Mind and Language 
25/2 (2010): 196-216. 
Wharton, Tim. Pragmatics and Non-Verbal Communication. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Wilson, Deirdre. “Metarepresentation in linguistic communication”. UCL Working 
Papers in Linguistics 11 (1999): 127-161. 
Wilson, Deirdre. “Understanding and believing”. Plenary talk delivered at the 4th 
International  Conference Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication, Madrid 
15-17 November, 2010. 
Wilson, Deirdre. “The conceptual-procedural distinction: Past, present and future”. 
In Procedural Meaning: Problems and Perspectives, edited by M. Victoria 
Escandell Vidal, Manuel Leonetti and Aoife Ahern, 3-31. Bingley: Emerald, 
2011. 
Wilson, Deirdre. “Irony comprehension: A developmental perspective”. Journal of 
Pragmatics 59/A (2013): 40-56. 
Wilson, Deirdre and Neil V. Smith. “Special issue on relevance theory”. Lingua 90 
(1993). 
Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber. “Mood and the analysis of non-declarative 
Sentences”. In Human Agency: Language, Duty and Value, edited by Jonathan 
Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik and C. C. W. Taylor, 77-101. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988. 
Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber. “Inference and implicature”. In Pragmatics: A 
Reader, edited by Steven Davis, 377-393. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991a. 
Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber. “Pragmatics and modularity”. In Pragmatics: A 
Reader, edited by Steven Davis, 583-595. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991b. 
Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber. “Linguistic form and relevance”. Lingua 90 
(1993): 1-26. 
Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber. “Relevance theory”. UCL Working Papers in 
Linguistics 14 (2002): 249-287. 
Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber, D. “Relevance theory”. In The Handbook of 
Pragmatics edited by Larry Horn and Gregory Ward, 607-632. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004. 
Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber. Meaning and Relevance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012. 
Wilson, Deirdre and Tim Wharton. “Relevance and prosody”. Journal of Pragmatics 
38 (2006): 1559-1579. 
Witczak-Plisiecka, Iwona. From Speech Acts to Speech Actions. Lodz: Lodz 
University Press, 2013. 
Yus Ramos, Francisco. “La significación social de las máximas de Grice: el caso del 
cómic alternativo inglés”. Revista Canaria de Estudios Ingleses 30-31 (1995): 
109-128. 
Yus Ramos, Francisco. Cooperación y relevancia. Dos aproximaciones pragmáticas 
a la interpretación. Alicante: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Alicante, 1997. 
Yus Ramos, Francisco. “A decade of relevance theory”. Journal of Pragmatics 30 
(1998): 305-345. 
Yus Ramos, Francisco. “Towards a pragmatic taxonomy of misunderstandings”. 
Revista Canaria de Estudios Ingleses 38 (1999a): 217-239. 
Yus Ramos, Francisco. “Misunderstandings and explicit/implicit communication”. 
Pragmatics 9 (1999b): 487-517. 
Yus Ramos, Francisco. Ciberpragmática. El uso del lenguaje en Internet. Barcelona: 
Ariel, 2001. 
Yus Ramos, Francisco. “Humor and the search for relevance”. Journal of 
Pragmatics 35 (2003): 1295-1331. 
Yus Ramos, Francisco. “A relevance-theoretic classification of jokes”. Lodz Papers 
in Pragmatics 4 (2008): 131-157. 
Yus Ramos, Francisco. Ciberpragmática 2.0. Nuevos usos del lenguaje en Internet. 
Barcelona: Ariel, 2010. 
Yus Ramos, Francisco. Cyberpragmatics. Internet-Mediated Communication in 
Context. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2011. 
Yus Ramos, Francisco. "An inference-centered analysis of jokes: The Intersecting 
Circles Model of humorous communication”. In Irony and Humor: Highlights 
and Genres, edited by Leonor Ruiz Gurillo and Beatriz Alvarado, 59-82. 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2013. 
Yus Ramos, Francisco. Humour and Relevance. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, in 
press. 
Žegarac, Vladimir. “What is phatic communication?” In Current Issues in Relevance 
Theory, edited by Villy Rouchota and Andreas H. Jucker, 327-361. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins, 1998. 
Žegarac, Vladimir and Billy Clark. “Phatic interpretations and phatic 
communication”. Journal of Linguistics 35 (1999a): 321-346. 
Žegarac, Vladimir and Billy Clark. “Phatic communication and relevance theory: A 
reply to Ward & Horn”. Journal of Linguistics 35 (1999b): 565-577. 
